Monday, 26 October 2026

THE REGIONAL TRIBUNAL: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW REPORT

 

The question pending before the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, in relation to Tribunal Institutionalization, for the people of Ghana is, why the need of Regional Tribunal, despite the existence of interwoven Judicial Court system, from the District, Circuit and the High Court, as well the Appeal and the Supreme Court? The implicit reasoning to that question is, what is the proposed set of function, for the Tribunal system, which distinguish it from the Judicial Court, or the Common law Esquire Court system: Of what constraints is necessitating the Judicial Court system, unable to leave up to the expected competence, upon which the Tribunal Court, could efficiently discharge, such duty of Justice, to the satisfaction of the people of Ghana. 

The questions raised in the first paragraph, of which the 1992 Constitution, of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, could not answer, and the Constitutional Committee’s review report, citing from B4.147 and B4.149 sought to explain, why the letters of the 1992 Constitution failed to grant the response, to the probe question, and proceeded in their recommendation, citing from B4.155,  requested for Regional Tribunal to be dis-established from the 1992 Constitution, with it set-out resources by government, rather invested  into the strengthening of the Common law Court system of Ghana, as a whole. 

The author submission of argument, herein, is for the re-consideration of the Tribunal system, and it Institutionalization, pursuant to Article 142 of the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, but of this instance, the scope of function, as stipulated by Article 143 of the 1992 Constitution, be reviewed, to have a recognizable jurisdiction, to be outlined in Section (1), (2) and (3), distinguishable from the Common law Esquire Court system, and uphold the Common law Court of Chancery system, having the Commercial division of Court of Ghana Judiciary, be granted the Tribunal Jurisdiction, which the United States legal system sectioned it as, Court of Equity, or the Equity Tribunal, with her breadth of application of the law on circumstantial events, as in Commercial and Corporate litigations, manifest on principles of fairness and conscience, agreeable to parties as dispute resolution, reasonably justified, with power of enforceable warrant binding parties, devoid of strict rules of common law. With statute guiding only the procedures, as means to an end, citing the International Arbitration Court, as standard of reference, with the method of presiding on such cases, by adversarial, rather than adjudication method, required in strict rules of Common law.

____________________________

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law. Oxford University fellow. University of Ghana fellow, distinguished fellow, Ghana School of Law.

Wednesday, 21 October 2026

JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE OF GHANA: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW REPORT [ VOL.3]

 

The response of this paper, on the procedural dismiss, of the Justices of the Superior Court, and or the Chief Justice, as a volume (3) brief, to the recommendation of the Constitutional Committee’s  review report;  I did refuse to grant a rebuttal views, on the Commentaries of the Committee’s report, citing from B4.119 to B4.141; and rather, opted to address the cardinal issue, pertinent to the concerns, which will complement in setting-out the Constitutional rules objectively, in response to the demands of changing times, per the review of the phrasal constructs, to Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution, Section (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7).

                However, wholly concur with the Committee recommendation, citing from B4.142,  on the grounds of removal of the Justices of the Superior Court, and or the Chief Justice, as stipulated by the Constitution, pursuant to Article 146, Section (1), to be a universal applied conditions, for the Judges of all the Courts in Ghana, either the Upper Court or the Lower Court. Furthermore, do agree with the recommendation, citing B4.142(a), contrary to Article 146, Section (3) and (6), which, I quote;

(3) “ If the President receives a petition for the removal of Justice of a Superior Court, other than the Chief Justice, or for the removal of the Chairman of a Regional Tribunal, he shall refer the petition to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether there is a prima facie case.”

(6) “ Where the petition is for the removal of the Chief Justice, the President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State, appoint a committee consisting of two Justices of the Supreme Court, one of whom shall be appointed chairman by the President, and three other persons who are not members of the Council of State, nor members of Parliament, nor lawyers.”

Thou, the recommendation for the confidential petition, to dismiss a Justice of a Superior Court, and or a Chief Justices, as a matter of procedure, is to be channeled to the Chairman of the Council of State, rather than the President, is a reasonable view, in good standing to the spirit of the Constitution, in contemporary governance; it shield the Executive Office, from perceptive manipulation attacks, under a political agenda, of candidature choices, for the Court. While the lower Court disciplinary sanctions, in purview of Judicial Council, and in accordance to the 1992 Constitution, is justifiable. However, the critical emphasis to the author’s argument, submitting herein, is to have a defined procedure, governing the content of Petition, qualified to invoke State apparatus, to avoid waste of precious government time, and limited resources, for investigation of no merit.

The recommendation therein, should be a set-out standard of rules, as litmus test of evidence, to guide the admittance of cases by the Chairman of the Council of State, on the subject of Judicial disciplinary sanctions, as prima facie merit: Before the Council of State Chamber, shall proceed to constitute, a Committee of investigative body or a Tribunal to establish the Substance and Form of the Case, on behalf of Government, for a dismissal of the Culprit.

The structure in constituting the Tribunal, as proposed by the Constitutional review committee report, for disciplinary sanctions of the Justices of the Superior Court,  and or the Chief Justice, per an indicted petition,  against their candidature and Office, I object not, thou, consider it justifiable, for the spirit of the Constitution.

______________________________

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law, Oxford University fellow. Fulbright fellow J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Utah, United States. Distinguished fellow, Ghana School of Law.

 

 

 

Monday, 19 October 2026

JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE OF GHANA: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW REPORT [ VOL 2.]


               In accordance to the Constitutional review report, and citing from B4.96 to B4.109, depicts a narration of notion; presumed by the Committee, as the principles of Judicial Administrative practices of the Ghana Court, categorized into Judicial leadership and the General Administrative authority, vested into a single office of the Chief Justice, with a conception that, the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, has failed to establish safeguard rules, to control arbitrary powers of the apex Court, thereby, risking the entire Administrative management system of the Court, into an  individual autonomy, and discretionary decision mistakes.

                A careful analysis of the cited argument of the Constitutional review report, from B4.97 on the Administrative powers of the Chief Justice, for case allocation and empanelment of Justices and Judges, transfer of Judicial officers, oversight of Court registries, and Court administration; the question raised by the author is, could there be any set-out rules of Constitutional text of construct, beyond the existing text of the 1992 Constitution, as a response onto the ever-changing Administrative duties of the Judiciary Court, examining the concerns raised by the report? If, there is, then, I will assure the Committee, it never a Constitutional review, but a legislative instrument or statute analysis.

                In furtherance, the argument as submitted by the review report, citing B4.98; as core Administrative work of the Judiciary, with the empanelment of Judges to cases, and Court management, which fall in the rudiment of Judicial administrative rules, and demands an experience leadership, of a competent Judicial officer: Could there be any provision of the Constitution, as a best fit rules, to govern such actions? I am tempted to belief, the Committee failed to appreciate, the essence, and emphasis, on the rigorous in Constitutional procedural requirement, towards the appointment of a Chief Justice, as outlined in Article 144 (1) of the 1992 Constitution, as put-forward in the Vol.1 of this paper.

               Establishing, the defense of refute against the Constitutional review report, on B4.98  and B4.99, I  argue, it impossible to produce a Constitutional text of rules, to fluid Administrative power; the essence of Statutes,  as legislative instrument for  Administrative rules, to allow for reasonable time period amendment. Secondly, the relevance of competent personnel to assume such offices, appreciating the demands, and requisite capacity to discharge the duty, without disappointing it stakeholders. Hence, the emphasis to address the concerns raised, if, there is any, is the Appointment suitability and  Procedural audit to the Office of Chief Justice, under the checks and balances of Government, by the Constitution, as put forwards by the Vol.1 of the author’s paper.

                  In accordance to the Constitutional review report, citing from B4.101, which disagrees with the Constitutional provision of Article 136,  Section (1a), (1b) and (1c), as well Article 139, Section (1a), (1b) and (1c); as inappropriateness to the Court, to the Judges hierarchy, deny Institutional autonomy, and blurs Institutional boundaries, with the opinion that, it can create uncertainty regarding decisions of the independence of Judges, at lower levels, in relation to administrative oversight; In  annexed to the review report of B4.102; I am persuaded, the Constitutional review report, on the subject matter, seems to narrate the prejudice relating to Judicial Administrative concerns, rather, than the substantive facts governing the domain.

                The rhetorical questions in citing from B4.101 is, could the Judges, at the High Court, or the Appeal Court, operate as Institutional autonomy, independent from the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice? If  so, as proposed, then, do Ghana have a Judicial system? If, the argument, is to relief the Chief Justice from those Courts, in contravention to Article 136 and 139 of the 1992 Constitution, then, who do Ghanaians hold liable as gatekeeper of the Court, when there is a manifested incompetence of a Judge, leading to a miscarriage of Justice, for the people of Ghana?

               Does the statement of Article 136 (1a), (1b), and (1c) thou quote,

“ (1) The Court of Appeal shall consist of -

(a) the Chief Justice

 

(b) subject to clauses (2) and (3) of this article, not less than ten

Justices of the Court of Appeal; and

 

(c) such other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature as the

Chief Justice may, for the determination of a particular cause or

matter by writing signed by him, request to sit in the Court of

                              Appeal for any specified period.”                                                                                

Do the phrase in quote,  translate in the Committee’s reviews report, as the required direct presence of the Chief Justice, nor blurs Institutional boundaries, as well deny Institutional autonomy? If  so, then, it has to be admitted, the Committee’s seem to me, they lack understanding of how the Judicial Administrative Court system work, more so, the framework of how the Anglo-American legal system function, upon which the 1992 Constitution, holds it prototype model. The defense argument in favour of the 1992 Constitution, subject the Constitutional review report, citing B4.103, B4.104 and B4.105  for nuanced scrutiny, and re-consideration.

             If, the Committee review report, citing B4.107, B4.108, B4.109; is worthy of critical consideration, then, will refer the Committee to acquaint themselves of Article 154 of the 1992 Constitution, on the functions of the Judicial Council, towards the Administrative governance of the Chief Justice. And proceed to Article 157, on the Rules of  the Court Committee, in addition to  Article 159; which establishes the safeguard rules, towards the governance of the Chief Justice, for the Administrative purposes of the Court, to discharge Justice, for the people of Ghana.

                    I, thou, shall indulge the Constitutional Committee, to reconsider their recommendation, citing B4.110;  it struggles with inherent contradictions, and rather exult the text of the 1992 Constitution, for the Administrative power of the Chief Justice, hence, shall ask the following questions, on the Committee’s amendment recommendation, for re-consideration. The recommended amendment of B4.110 (1) to B4.110 (2b) under the principles of Judicial Administration  does it not contradict itself ? The amendment recommendation of B4.110 (3a), does the proposed President of the Appeal Court, in the spirit of  Institutional autonomy, grant the Office, a Constitutional obligation to the cases or to the Staffs?

Does the required qualification of knowledge, and experience of being a Registrar to the Court, sufficient to empanel Justices, better than the Chief Justice?

And who do we hold liable in the accountability of the  impaneled Justices, if they fail to discharge their duty, of competency to the Court ? The Registrar or the Chief Justice ?

These questions stated above, are meant to interrogate the recommended amendment, by the Constitutional committee review report, for Judicial Governance.

 ______________________________           

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law, Oxford University fellow. Fulbright fellow J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Utah, United States. Distinguished fellow, Ghana School of Law.

 

             

Friday, 16 October 2026

JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE OF GHANA: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW REPORT [ VOL.1]

 

Submitting to the preliminary argument of the Constitution reviewed committee report, for the Judiciary of Ghana via the historic unveiled events, of democratic governance experimentation, commencing from the first Republic to the fourth Republic, citing from B4.31 and B4.32 of the report, with emphasis on Executive dominance. I hold a sharp contrasting opinion to B4.33 of the Committee’s report, that the 1992 Constitution concentrated significant authority in small number of Institutional nodes, at the apex of Judicial system; rather, do argue, the challenge has been, the qualified application of principles in Judicial administration, which in practice, has failed to measure up to the true spirit of the 1992 Constitutional provisions, projected in letters. Thou, admit to the argument, to review the workload, being a challenge to the Supreme Court, citing from the Committee’s report of B4.34.

I will concur to the Committee’s report, on the jurisdiction concerns of the Supreme Court, as it is in the letters of the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, citing from B4.36, B4.37, B4.38, B4.39; with emphasis to the Constitutional Committee’s outlined concerns, cited from B4.41, B4.42, B4.43. B4.44 of the report, and the proposed recommendations, citing from B4.49, B4.50, B4.51, B4.52, and B4.53; as well the proposed amendment by the report, citing from B4.54.

Furthermore, the structural amendment of the Judiciary Court, and the filtering focus for the Supreme Court jurisdiction, citing from the Committee’s report B4.36  to B4.54 argued on the basis of the size of the Supreme Court, by it number of Justices, proposing a shift in the minimum of ten (10), as the limit of the lower threshold, by the 1992 Constitution, to a maximum of fourteen (14) as panel members, of the Supreme Court, capped by the Committee’s report: Which, I side with the 1992 Constitutional text, as reliable and absolute rule, in the panel of Judges to the Supreme Court, with conviction to that rule, in standing the test of time, for Judicial governance and Ghana democratic experimentation, under Constitutional review scholarship; thou, defend on the following grounds,

  I.  I do acknowledge, the Committee’s report citing from B4.58, emphasizing on potential perceptions of Executive manipulation for the apex Court, through appointments. Thou, with contrary opinion argue, such concerns fails to have  relevance in Judicial governance, when proposed amendment in the second paragraph, of this paper, as cited from the Committee’s report B4.54, is effected, to consolidate the applicable provisions, in the 1992 Constitution, Article 130, 131, 132, 133, 134 and 135.

II.  The second response, interrogatively enquire, why the need of the provision of Article 128, Section (1) of the 1992 Constitution? And shall quote;

“ The Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice, and not less than nine other Justices of the Supreme Court.”

The construct of the text, in the letters of the Constitution, acknowledges, the frailty of human nature, which could weaken the capacity of the Court, in a given circumstance, relative to the demands of the Population density of Ghana, and will require internal administrative re-organizing, to respond to cases, not necessarily a procedural requirement of new appointments.

Hence, Section (2) of the same Article, categorically outlined, the panel members required to constitute a full Supreme Court, and administer her work; hereby, quote,

“ The Supreme Court shall be duly constituted for its work by not less than five Supreme Court Justices, except as otherwise provided in Article 133 of this Constitution.”

The claim of political culture influence or Executive dominance, in the doctrine of perception, ipso factor manipulation into the Judicial governance and administrative duty, lacks grounds in substantive legal defense, on the basis of what the law is, by the Constitutional provisions, and how the Court should practically work.

The law establishes the procedural requirement in the appointment of the Chief Justice, under Article 144 (1), and other Justices, as outlined in Section (2) of the same Article, which I quote;

(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.

(2) The other Supreme Court Justices shall be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament. 

Arguing in reference to the Committee’s report, on perception doctrine of the Executive dominance, relying on section (2) of Article 144, quoted above,  is to acknowledge that, the Chief Justice presides on the Judicial Council as the Chairperson, and the Executive arm led by the President, cannot appoint any other Justices, to the Supreme Court, without an explicit Judicial council reasonable defense in advice, of necessity, in law; is a  sine qua non for such appointment, with the President proceeding in action, in consultation with the Council of State, and the approval of Parliament. Hence, the justification to the Committee’s report of perception doctrine, cited from B4.58 and B4.59; is insubstantial.

III. Thirdly, the Judicial Council’s advice in Judicial appointment, is not binding on the President, as cited in the Committee review report B4.79,  is in contravention to what the law is, and the Constitutional provision of section (2) of Article 144, as earlier quoted,

“ The other Supreme Court Justices shall be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.”

The section (2) of the Article 144, never grant a discretion power and action to the President, in appointment of other Justices, he is constitutionally obliged, to act upon the prerogative advice of the Judicial Council. And proceed in Consultation with the Council of State; expresses that the purpose of negotiation, in this realm is different, which could be a subject matter of validation, welfare issues of the candidate(s), as the circumstance of the engagement, will required, with the approval of Parliament; one acknowledges by the construct of the text, the negotiable and crucial role of Parliament, in the procedural appointment of the Justice(s), is checks and balances of suitability of candidate(s), worthy of government expenditure.

       Thou, hold exception to the amendment proposition of Article 128(1), by the Constitutional review Committee’s report, with the grounds of defense above, citing from B4.69  of the  report, to be re-considered.

 _________________________

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law, Oxford University fellow. Fulbright fellow J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Utah, United States. Distinguished fellow, Ghana School of Law.

 

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