Submitting to the preliminary argument of the Constitution reviewed committee report, for the Judiciary of Ghana via the historic unveiled events, of democratic governance experimentation, commencing from the first Republic to the fourth Republic, citing from B4.31 and B4.32 of the report, with emphasis on Executive dominance. I hold a sharp contrasting opinion to B4.33 of the Committee’s report, that the 1992 Constitution concentrated significant authority in small number of Institutional nodes, at the apex of Judicial system; rather, do argue, the challenge has been, the qualified application of principles in Judicial administration, which in practice, has failed to measure up to the true spirit of the 1992 Constitutional provisions, projected in letters. Thou, admit to the argument, to review the workload, being a challenge to the Supreme Court, citing from the Committee’s report of B4.34.
I will concur to the Committee’s report, on the jurisdiction concerns of the Supreme Court, as it is in the letters of the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, citing from B4.36, B4.37, B4.38, B4.39; with emphasis to the Constitutional Committee’s outlined concerns, cited from B4.41, B4.42, B4.43. B4.44 of the report, and the proposed recommendations, citing from B4.49, B4.50, B4.51, B4.52, and B4.53; as well the proposed amendment by the report, citing from B4.54.
Furthermore, the structural amendment of the Judiciary Court, and the filtering focus for the Supreme Court jurisdiction, citing from the Committee’s report B4.36 to B4.54 argued on the basis of the size of the Supreme Court, by it number of Justices, proposing a shift in the minimum of ten (10), as the limit of the lower threshold, by the 1992 Constitution, to a maximum of fourteen (14) as panel members, of the Supreme Court, capped by the Committee’s report: Which, I side with the 1992 Constitutional text, as reliable and absolute rule, in the panel of Judges to the Supreme Court, with conviction to that rule, in standing the test of time, for Judicial governance and Ghana democratic experimentation, under Constitutional review scholarship; thou, defend on the following grounds,
I. I do acknowledge, the Committee’s report citing from B4.58, emphasizing on potential perceptions of Executive manipulation for the apex Court, through appointments. Thou, with contrary opinion argue, such concerns fails to have relevance in Judicial governance, when proposed amendment in the second paragraph, of this paper, as cited from the Committee’s report B4.54, is effected, to consolidate the applicable provisions, in the 1992 Constitution, Article 130, 131, 132, 133, 134 and 135.
II. The second response, interrogatively enquire, why the need of the provision of Article 128, Section (1) of the 1992 Constitution? And shall quote;
“ The Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice, and not less than nine other Justices of the Supreme Court.”
The construct of the text, in the letters of the Constitution, acknowledges, the frailty of human nature, which could weaken the capacity of the Court, in a given circumstance, relative to the demands of the Population density of Ghana, and will require internal administrative re-organizing, to respond to cases, not necessarily a procedural requirement of new appointments.
Hence, Section (2) of the same Article, categorically outlined, the panel members required to constitute a full Supreme Court, and administer her work; hereby, quote,
“ The Supreme Court shall be duly constituted for its work by not less than five Supreme Court Justices, except as otherwise provided in Article 133 of this Constitution.”
The claim of political culture influence or Executive dominance, in the doctrine of perception, ipso factor manipulation into the Judicial governance and administrative duty, lacks grounds in substantive legal defense, on the basis of what the law is, by the Constitutional provisions, and how the Court should practically work.
The law establishes the procedural requirement in the appointment of the Chief Justice, under Article 144 (1), and other Justices, as outlined in Section (2) of the same Article, which I quote;
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.
(2) The other Supreme Court Justices shall be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.
Arguing in reference to the Committee’s report, on perception doctrine of the Executive dominance, relying on section (2) of Article 144, quoted above, is to acknowledge that, the Chief Justice presides on the Judicial Council as the Chairperson, and the Executive arm led by the President, cannot appoint any other Justices, to the Supreme Court, without an explicit Judicial council reasonable defense in advice, of necessity, in law; is a sine qua non for such appointment, with the President proceeding in action, in consultation with the Council of State, and the approval of Parliament. Hence, the justification to the Committee’s report of perception doctrine, cited from B4.58 and B4.59; is insubstantial.
III. Thirdly, the Judicial Council’s advice in Judicial appointment, is not binding on the President, as cited in the Committee review report B4.79, is in contravention to what the law is, and the Constitutional provision of section (2) of Article 144, as earlier quoted,
“ The other Supreme Court Justices shall be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.”
The section (2) of the Article 144, never grant a discretion power and action to the President, in appointment of other Justices, he is constitutionally obliged, to act upon the prerogative advice of the Judicial Council. And proceed in Consultation with the Council of State; expresses that the purpose of negotiation, in this realm is different, which could be a subject matter of validation, welfare issues of the candidate(s), as the circumstance of the engagement, will required, with the approval of Parliament; one acknowledges by the construct of the text, the negotiable and crucial role of Parliament, in the procedural appointment of the Justice(s), is checks and balances of suitability of candidate(s), worthy of government expenditure.
Thou, hold exception to the amendment proposition of Article 128(1), by the Constitutional review Committee’s report, with the grounds of defense above, citing from B4.69 of the report, to be re-considered.
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Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law, Oxford University fellow. Fulbright fellow J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Utah, United States. Distinguished fellow, Ghana School of Law.