Monday, 19 October 2026

JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE OF GHANA: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW REPORT [ VOL 2.]


               In accordance to the Constitutional review report, and citing from B4.96 to B4.109, depicts a narration of notion; presumed by the Committee, as the principles of Judicial Administrative practices of the Ghana Court, categorized into Judicial leadership and the General Administrative authority, vested into a single office of the Chief Justice, with a conception that, the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, has failed to establish safeguard rules, to control arbitrary powers of the apex Court, thereby, risking the entire Administrative management system of the Court, into an  individual autonomy, and discretionary decision mistakes.

                A careful analysis of the cited argument of the Constitutional review report, from B4.97 on the Administrative powers of the Chief Justice, for case allocation and empanelment of Justices and Judges, transfer of Judicial officers, oversight of Court registries, and Court administration; the question raised by the author is, could there be any set-out rules of Constitutional text of construct, beyond the existing text of the 1992 Constitution, as a response onto the ever-changing Administrative duties of the Judiciary Court, examining the concerns raised by the report? If, there is, then, I will assure the Committee, it never a Constitutional review, but a legislative instrument or statute analysis.

                In furtherance, the argument as submitted by the review report, citing B4.98; as core Administrative work of the Judiciary, with the empanelment of Judges to cases, and Court management, which fall in the rudiment of Judicial administrative rules, and demands an experience leadership, of a competent Judicial officer: Could there be any provision of the Constitution, as a best fit rules, to govern such actions? I am tempted to belief, the Committee failed to appreciate, the essence, and emphasis, on the rigorous in Constitutional procedural requirement, towards the appointment of a Chief Justice, as outlined in Article 144 (1) of the 1992 Constitution, as put-forward in the Vol.1 of this paper.

               Establishing, the defense of refute against the Constitutional review report, on B4.98  and B4.99, I  argue, it impossible to produce a Constitutional text of rules, to fluid Administrative power; the essence of Statutes,  as legislative instrument for  Administrative rules, to allow for reasonable time period amendment. Secondly, the relevance of competent personnel to assume such offices, appreciating the demands, and requisite capacity to discharge the duty, without disappointing it stakeholders. Hence, the emphasis to address the concerns raised, if, there is any, is the Appointment suitability and  Procedural audit to the Office of Chief Justice, under the checks and balances of Government, by the Constitution, as put forwards by the Vol.1 of the author’s paper.

                  In accordance to the Constitutional review report, citing from B4.101, which disagrees with the Constitutional provision of Article 136,  Section (1a), (1b) and (1c), as well Article 139, Section (1a), (1b) and (1c); as inappropriateness to the Court, to the Judges hierarchy, deny Institutional autonomy, and blurs Institutional boundaries, with the opinion that, it can create uncertainty regarding decisions of the independence of Judges, at lower levels, in relation to administrative oversight; In  annexed to the review report of B4.102; I am persuaded, the Constitutional review report, on the subject matter, seems to narrate the prejudice relating to Judicial Administrative concerns, rather, than the substantive facts governing the domain.

                The rhetorical questions in citing from B4.101 is, could the Judges, at the High Court, or the Appeal Court, operate as Institutional autonomy, independent from the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice? If  so, as proposed, then, do Ghana have a Judicial system? If, the argument, is to relief the Chief Justice from those Courts, in contravention to Article 136 and 139 of the 1992 Constitution, then, who do Ghanaians hold liable as gatekeeper of the Court, when there is a manifested incompetence of a Judge, leading to a miscarriage of Justice, for the people of Ghana?

               Does the statement of Article 136 (1a), (1b), and (1c) thou quote,

“ (1) The Court of Appeal shall consist of -

(a) the Chief Justice

 

(b) subject to clauses (2) and (3) of this article, not less than ten

Justices of the Court of Appeal; and

 

(c) such other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature as the

Chief Justice may, for the determination of a particular cause or

matter by writing signed by him, request to sit in the Court of

                              Appeal for any specified period.”                                                                                

Do the phrase in quote,  translate in the Committee’s reviews report, as the required direct presence of the Chief Justice, nor blurs Institutional boundaries, as well deny Institutional autonomy? If  so, then, it has to be admitted, the Committee’s seem to me, they lack understanding of how the Judicial Administrative Court system work, more so, the framework of how the Anglo-American legal system function, upon which the 1992 Constitution, holds it prototype model. The defense argument in favour of the 1992 Constitution, subject the Constitutional review report, citing B4.103, B4.104 and B4.105  for nuanced scrutiny, and re-consideration.

             If, the Committee review report, citing B4.107, B4.108, B4.109; is worthy of critical consideration, then, will refer the Committee to acquaint themselves of Article 154 of the 1992 Constitution, on the functions of the Judicial Council, towards the Administrative governance of the Chief Justice. And proceed to Article 157, on the Rules of  the Court Committee, in addition to  Article 159; which establishes the safeguard rules, towards the governance of the Chief Justice, for the Administrative purposes of the Court, to discharge Justice, for the people of Ghana.

                    I, thou, shall indulge the Constitutional Committee, to reconsider their recommendation, citing B4.110;  it struggles with inherent contradictions, and rather exult the text of the 1992 Constitution, for the Administrative power of the Chief Justice, hence, shall ask the following questions, on the Committee’s amendment recommendation, for re-consideration. The recommended amendment of B4.110 (1) to B4.110 (2b) under the principles of Judicial Administration  does it not contradict itself ? The amendment recommendation of B4.110 (3a), does the proposed President of the Appeal Court, in the spirit of  Institutional autonomy, grant the Office, a Constitutional obligation to the cases or to the Staffs?

Does the required qualification of knowledge, and experience of being a Registrar to the Court, sufficient to empanel Justices, better than the Chief Justice?

And who do we hold liable in the accountability of the  impaneled Justices, if they fail to discharge their duty, of competency to the Court ? The Registrar or the Chief Justice ?

These questions stated above, are meant to interrogate the recommended amendment, by the Constitutional committee review report, for Judicial Governance.

 ______________________________           

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law, Oxford University fellow. Fulbright fellow J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Utah, United States. Distinguished fellow, Ghana School of Law.

 

             

Friday, 16 October 2026

JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE OF GHANA: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW REPORT [ VOL.1]

 

Submitting to the preliminary argument of the Constitution reviewed committee report, for the Judiciary of Ghana via the historic unveiled events, of democratic governance experimentation, commencing from the first Republic to the fourth Republic, citing from B4.31 and B4.32 of the report, with emphasis on Executive dominance. I hold a sharp contrasting opinion to B4.33 of the Committee’s report, that the 1992 Constitution concentrated significant authority in small number of Institutional nodes, at the apex of Judicial system; rather, do argue, the challenge has been, the qualified application of principles in Judicial administration, which in practice, has failed to measure up to the true spirit of the 1992 Constitutional provisions, projected in letters. Thou, admit to the argument, to review the workload, being a challenge to the Supreme Court, citing from the Committee’s report of B4.34.

I will concur to the Committee’s report, on the jurisdiction concerns of the Supreme Court, as it is in the letters of the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, citing from B4.36, B4.37, B4.38, B4.39; with emphasis to the Constitutional Committee’s outlined concerns, cited from B4.41, B4.42, B4.43. B4.44 of the report, and the proposed recommendations, citing from B4.49, B4.50, B4.51, B4.52, and B4.53; as well the proposed amendment by the report, citing from B4.54.

Furthermore, the structural amendment of the Judiciary Court, and the filtering focus for the Supreme Court jurisdiction, citing from the Committee’s report B4.36  to B4.54 argued on the basis of the size of the Supreme Court, by it number of Justices, proposing a shift in the minimum of ten (10), as the limit of the lower threshold, by the 1992 Constitution, to a maximum of fourteen (14) as panel members, of the Supreme Court, capped by the Committee’s report: Which, I side with the 1992 Constitutional text, as reliable and absolute rule, in the panel of Judges to the Supreme Court, with conviction to that rule, in standing the test of time, for Judicial governance and Ghana democratic experimentation, under Constitutional review scholarship; thou, defend on the following grounds,

  I.  I do acknowledge, the Committee’s report citing from B4.58, emphasizing on potential perceptions of Executive manipulation for the apex Court, through appointments. Thou, with contrary opinion argue, such concerns fails to have  relevance in Judicial governance, when proposed amendment in the second paragraph, of this paper, as cited from the Committee’s report B4.54, is effected, to consolidate the applicable provisions, in the 1992 Constitution, Article 130, 131, 132, 133, 134 and 135.

II.  The second response, interrogatively enquire, why the need of the provision of Article 128, Section (1) of the 1992 Constitution? And shall quote;

“ The Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice, and not less than nine other Justices of the Supreme Court.”

The construct of the text, in the letters of the Constitution, acknowledges, the frailty of human nature, which could weaken the capacity of the Court, in a given circumstance, relative to the demands of the Population density of Ghana, and will require internal administrative re-organizing, to respond to cases, not necessarily a procedural requirement of new appointments.

Hence, Section (2) of the same Article, categorically outlined, the panel members required to constitute a full Supreme Court, and administer her work; hereby, quote,

“ The Supreme Court shall be duly constituted for its work by not less than five Supreme Court Justices, except as otherwise provided in Article 133 of this Constitution.”

The claim of political culture influence or Executive dominance, in the doctrine of perception, ipso factor manipulation into the Judicial governance and administrative duty, lacks grounds in substantive legal defense, on the basis of what the law is, by the Constitutional provisions, and how the Court should practically work.

The law establishes the procedural requirement in the appointment of the Chief Justice, under Article 144 (1), and other Justices, as outlined in Section (2) of the same Article, which I quote;

(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.

(2) The other Supreme Court Justices shall be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament. 

Arguing in reference to the Committee’s report, on perception doctrine of the Executive dominance, relying on section (2) of Article 144, quoted above,  is to acknowledge that, the Chief Justice presides on the Judicial Council as the Chairperson, and the Executive arm led by the President, cannot appoint any other Justices, to the Supreme Court, without an explicit Judicial council reasonable defense in advice, of necessity, in law; is a  sine qua non for such appointment, with the President proceeding in action, in consultation with the Council of State, and the approval of Parliament. Hence, the justification to the Committee’s report of perception doctrine, cited from B4.58 and B4.59; is insubstantial.

III. Thirdly, the Judicial Council’s advice in Judicial appointment, is not binding on the President, as cited in the Committee review report B4.79,  is in contravention to what the law is, and the Constitutional provision of section (2) of Article 144, as earlier quoted,

“ The other Supreme Court Justices shall be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.”

The section (2) of the Article 144, never grant a discretion power and action to the President, in appointment of other Justices, he is constitutionally obliged, to act upon the prerogative advice of the Judicial Council. And proceed in Consultation with the Council of State; expresses that the purpose of negotiation, in this realm is different, which could be a subject matter of validation, welfare issues of the candidate(s), as the circumstance of the engagement, will required, with the approval of Parliament; one acknowledges by the construct of the text, the negotiable and crucial role of Parliament, in the procedural appointment of the Justice(s), is checks and balances of suitability of candidate(s), worthy of government expenditure.

       Thou, hold exception to the amendment proposition of Article 128(1), by the Constitutional review Committee’s report, with the grounds of defense above, citing from B4.69  of the  report, to be re-considered.

 _________________________

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law, Oxford University fellow. Fulbright fellow J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Utah, United States. Distinguished fellow, Ghana School of Law.

 

Tuesday, 13 October 2026

JRCLS –SECTIONAL BYLAWS FOR WEST AFRICA AREA

 

ARTICLE VIII.

1. The Africa West Area J. Reuben Clark Law Society, shall remain a formidable unit of JRCLS Global, in the ratification of the constitutional bylaws, governing the operations of the organization at the global level.

2. Acknowledging the peculiar legal problems, facing the Africa West Area Mission, of the Church, and the pragmatic required approach of the Legal profession, to address such myriad of problems, to the benefit of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, set to themselves additional bylaws, as sectional laws for the JRCLS members, within the aforementioned jurisdiction.

3. The ultimate purpose of the outlined sectional bylaws, is to ensure confidence in the legal practitioners, as members of the Church of Latter-day Saints, to commit in pro bono service, for the Area mission, within the Church.

4. To avoid the multiplicity of Institutional Identification via JRCLS logo usage, yet, in accordance to official purpose of the logo, as intellectual property, shall always define the jurisdictional territory, upon which the official logo, is used for it object clause. Hence, the used of JRCLS Logo, shall include the Africa West Area Chapter- identification, to the Logo, in all official usage, by the presiding officer.

5. For the purpose of Administrative office identification code, to easily appraise, and as well instill disciplinary measures, out of monitoring, as necessity to govern the jurisdiction efficiently, through the leadership, thereby, accord the following leadership titles and roles, starting at the Ward level of the Church, shall be identified as  ‘JRCLS Ward-Representive’, at the Stake level, shall be identified as, ‘JRCLS Stake-Coordinator’, at the Mission Area, shall be identified as JRCLS-Area Chairman, and at the Africa West Area, shall be identified as, ‘JRCLS-Africa West Area-President’.

6. In addition to the JRCLS Global bylaws, for membership admission, the sectional bylaws, considers the LDS record number, of a member, and the temple recommends, as  requirement for admission.

7. JRCLS Leadership in Africa West Area Jurisdiction, holds quarterly training and seminars, as mandatory for the preparation of leadership at bar, to be on top of legal cases and issues of the Church, in the mission area.

8. JRCLS members for the Church, serve both within the Church Law Society, and the Circular Law Society of Government, but under a distinct rules of obligations, privileges and commitment.

9. JRCLS Leadership of Africa West Area, beholds the duty at the Ward level leadership, to produce their Monthly Statement of Account, in every last Sunday of the Month, to their  JRCLS-Stake Coordinators, Who shall equally produce their Monthly Statement of Account, in the first Sunday of the new Month, to their Area Chairman.

10.  JRCLS Mission Area Chairman, produce their Monthly Statement of Account, to the President of the Africa West Area, on every Sunday, second week of a new Month.

11. The planning of General Conferences and training events of the Law Society, for JRCLS Africa West Area, shall be presided by the President of the Area, under a careful consented theme, beneficial to membership development, and the Church.

12.  Democratically consented decisions, for the Membership of JRCLS in Africa West Area, shall be organized in two major forums, either by democratic votes of units leadership, or by Executive decree.

13. A request of a Membership redrawal, shall be in a written letter of notice, to immediate superintending leadership, at least a motion of, twenty-one days notice.

14.  A request of Leadership removal, shall be, a petition of notice, to the JRCLS- Africa West Area Tribunal, in addition to two-third votes, of no confidence, from the same Unit, against that leader, under a contention from the unit.

15. The rules and practice of the jurisdiction, by the JRCLS membership, shall stem from the following regulatory orders;

I. The Bylaws of JRCLS

II. The uphold customary traditions, of the Law Society of the Jurisdiction.


 [Brief Bio of the President]:

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, is Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of Law, Oxford University fellow, a Fulbright fellow at J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Utah. United States. A professor of Constitutional Law and Economic Criminology; the President of the J. Reuben Clark Law Society - Africa West Area, as the Legal aid Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. A distinguished fellow to Ghana School of Law, and a Cross-Department Faculty member to University of Ghana, and Central University Faculty of Law. A member of the World Jurist Association, and an Advocate before the International Court of Justice.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW REPORT AND OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL GHANA

 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE REVIEW REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION


  The proposition as an amendments to Article 88(3), 88(4), and Article 218(b) and 218(e), to remove the Attorney-General’s authority to prosecute corruption and corruption-related offence, as well Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice authority to investigate corruption, and vest all such powers of investigation and prosecution of corruption, to an independent Anti-corruption and Ethics Commission(AEC): Fails to address the substantive core-problem, for amendment considerations, rather, it compound the problem with multiplicity of Institutional functions, and State financing burden. In furtherance, the use of the term Independent Institution for AEC, hold the implicit of a legislative Act, to establish such State Agency, which will always involve financial-expenditure Instrument, to respond to the proposed appointment for AEC office, which requires a Commissioner, with proposed two Deputy Commissioners, including the Agency working staffs and equipments, for the prosecutorial work; in accordance to the  recommendation cited in C.4211 and C4.212 of the Constitutional review report.

  Pursuant to Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution, of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, the Attorney-General Office, is a constitutional mandate, with the constitution textual construct, placing the Office as a Principal prosecutor of Government, therefore, the author holds exception to the amendment propositions of C4.211 and C4.212; and recommends, instead of creating new Executive Agencies by Legislative instrument, rather, the office of Attorney-General, could be designated to have specialized Divisions or Directorate offices, as follows;

     I.   The Office of Special Prosecutor, annexed to the Constitutional Act of Attorney-General Office, carved with it Object clause of Public mandate, to collaborate with the Economic and Organized Crime Office, for Investigations and Prosecution duties of high profile political crime cases.

     II.  The Office of  Anti-Corruption and Ethics, as proposed by the Constitutional review committee, can be another annexed divisional office or directorate, to the Constitutional mandate of Attorney-General Office, to collaborate effectively with the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice, to respond to the Constitutional demands of Article 218( e) of the 1992 Constitution, requiring the Office to Investigate all instances of alleges or suspected corruption, and the misappropriation of public moneys by Officials, and to take appropriate prosecutorial steps.

                   The Constitutional Committee discuss, by it report, on the structural conflict of Interest, inherent on the Attorney-General’s constitutional position, as both politician and member of cabinet, as well Chief legal adviser to the Government, as argued in C4.206;  the author, once again holds exception, herein to the argument, thou, posits, such stimulated public discuss could stem from, how the Office is currently administered under the 1992 Constitution. The textual construct of the Constitution, grant the Office an authority, as the only Government portfolio that manifest as both political and a technocrat Institution, which need to be treated in that dual portfolio function, as follows;

III. The Minister of Justice, as Attorney-General; serves as Legal Advisor to Government.

IV.  The Attorney-General, serving as the Central prosecutorial Authority for Government.

With the Minister of Justice, superintending on the generality of the Office functioning, for the Government. Therefore, the Constitutional review committee report, as cited  from C. 4.205, of the Office of Attorney-General, which I quote ‘While the power to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions is vested exclusively in the Attorney-General’s; serves at the pleasure of the President.’  In the opinion of the author, such posits lacks the locus standi for credible legal defense. However, if, the submission of the Committee report, as quoted above, is to be accepted on face level, as valid argument, then, the implicit is, all State Agencies of Executive warrant, shall serve at the pleasure of the President, on the reason of, the same set of conditions governs all of them, for their rules enactment, and appointment. With such logic deduction, then, why the need to create more Executive Institutions, by an Act of Parliament, as recommended by C4.211 and C4.212.

By practice, almost all Government Ministries of Constitutional mandate,  have a legal Department and Attorneys, therefore, the crucial role of the Attorney-General has been, and will always be, to complement those legal Departments, as a General Government prosecutor, in consolidating their efforts, to discharge cases before the Court of Justice, on behalf of Government, hence, the essence of the Constitutional title construct, Attorney-General, meaning the Principal office of all the Government Ministerial Legal Departments. The question will be, how should a Ministry of Government, in need of Legal Department, constitute the Office, without excess financial burden to Government?

               The author will propose, the Ministry Chief Executive Officer, understanding the nature of legal aid required for the Ministry, will consult the Office of the Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, to hold a Consortium with the Ghana Bar Association or the Ghana Law Society, to select the most suitable Legal Chambers of sector specialty, to be inducted, to a given Ministry, as Legal aid - Attorneys, under a special governmental funding instrument, for purposive duty, with the supervisory purview of the Minister of Justice.

   It should be acknowledged, the effort of the Constitutional review scholarship, is to construct a documentary text, which could stand the test of time, in preserving the spirit of the Constitution, in the rudiment of centenary and more. The act of regularly amending a Constitution, is a bad practice that devalue the power of the Constitutional text into a Statute, rather than it original authority, as a Charter. We should have a rule of time, as a Nation, which governs the amendment of our major statutes, at least in every decade (10th) year, hence, invest great effort in quality Statute development, and promulgation that will stand test of time, which serves the Court, for quality adjudication and plausible maintain the law. And with Constitutional review referendum, at least every Golden (50) year, relative to the population density and demanding choices of value, for the Government.

__________________________________

Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Sir William Blackstone Chair professor of  Law. Fulbright fellow J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Utah, United States. Fellow, Ghana School of Law.

 

 

 

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